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 Every legal system that ties judicial deci-
sion making to a body of preconceived norms 
has to face the tension between the normative 
formulation of the ideal and its approximation 
in social reality. In the parlance of the common 
law, it is, more concretely, the remedy that 
bridges the gap between the ideal and the real, 
or, rather, between norms and facts. In the 
common law world—particularly in the United 
Kingdom and the Commonwealth—a lively dis-
course has developed around the question of 
how rights relate to remedies. To the civilian le-
gal scholar—used to thinking within a frame-
work that strictly categorizes terms like sub-
stance and procedure, subjective right, action, 
and execution—the concept of remedy remains 
a mystery. The lack of “remedy” in the vocabu-
lary of the civil law is more than just a matter 
of attaching different labels to functional 
equivalents, it is the expression of a different 
way of thinking about law. Only if a legal sys-
tem is capable of satisfactorily transposing the 
abstract discourse of the law into social reality 
does the legal machinery fulfill its purpose: due 
to the pivotal importance of this translational 
process, the way it is cast in legal concepts thus 
allows for an insight into the deep structure of a 
legal culture, and, convergence notwithstand-
ing, the remaining epistemological differences 
between the legal traditions of the West. A 
mixed jurisdiction must reflect upon these dif-
ferences in order to understand its own condi-
tion and to define its future course. 
Tout système juridique qui lie la prise de 
décision judiciaire à un ensemble de normes 
préconçues doit faire face à la tension qui existe 
entre la formulation normative d’un idéal et son 
approximation dans la réalité sociale. Dans la 
terminologie de la common law, c’est le remède, 
plus concrètement, qui palie l’écart entre l’idéal 
et le réel, ou plutôt, entre les normes et les faits. 
Dans les juridictions de common law, plus 
particulièrement au Royaume-Uni et au sein du 
Commonwealth, un vif débat est apparu sur les 
liens que les droits entretiennent avec les 
remèdes. Pour le juriste civiliste, habitué à 
raisonner dans un cadre qui catégorise 
strictement des termes tels que substance et 
procédure, droit subjectif, action et exécution, le 
concept de remède demeure un mystère. 
L’absence de « remèdes » dans le vocabulaire du 
droit civil n’est pas une simple question de 
nomenclature divergente pour décrire des 
équivalents fonctionnels. Il s’agit de l’expression 
d’une façon différente d’aborder le droit. 
L’appareil juridique n’atteindra ses objectifs que 
s’il est capable de transposer le discours 
abstrait du droit en réalité sociale. Étant donné 
l’importance primordiale de ce processus de 
transposition, son expression dans des concepts 
juridiques révèle la structure profonde d’une 
culture juridique et les différences 
épistémologiques qui subsistent entre les 
traditions juridiques occidentales, malgré leur 
convergence. Une juridiction mixte doit réfléchir 
sur ces différences afin de comprendre son 
propre état et de définir son parcours futur. 
78     (2010) 56:1   MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  
 
 
 
I.  The Question 79 
II.  Remedies and Rights in the Common Law 81 
A. Traditional Pragmatism and the “Remedial Approach” 81 
B. Remedies and Rights: The Theoretical Debate 83 
 1. Rights in Private Law Discourse 84 
 2. The Quest for a Rights-Remedies Taxonomy 86 
III.  The Civil Law: Rights and their Procedural Realization 89 
A. Rights and Actions, not Rights and Remedies 89 
 1. Theoretical Structure: Procedure as the “Servant”  
of Substantive Law 89 
 2.  Terminology: The Absence of “Remedy” 91 
B. Origins 93 
 1.  A Tradition of Theorization 94 
 2. From the Roman Law of Actions to the Rise of the  
“Subjective Right” 95 
 3.  The Role of the Judge 102 
IV.  Some Comparative Remarks 104 
A. “Finding” Law and “Making” Rights: Equity, Good 
Faith, and Discretionary Awards 104 
B. Specific Performance 109 
Conclusion 113 
 
                                                                  REALIZATION OF RIGHTS IN COMMON AND CIVIL PRIVATE LAW  79 
 
 
I. The Question1 
  “Law”, writes Professor Paul Gewirtz, “mediates between the ideal 
and the real.”2 In the parlance of the common law it is, more concretely, 
the remedy that bridges the gap between the ideal and the real, or, rather, 
between norms and facts. Remedies realize rights; as the etymology of the 
term reveals, remedies are supposed to provide the tangible cure, to heal 
what the law conceptualizes as an injury—the violation of an abstract 
right. Remedies translate the abstract and lofty discourse of the law into 
the life-world of the disputants.  
 Every legal system that somehow ties judicial decision-making to a 
body of pre-formulated norms that, in other words, has evolved beyond a 
model of spontaneous administration of substantive justice, has to face 
the tension between the normative formulation of the ideal and its ap-
proximation in social reality.3 This problem cuts across the dividing lines 
between legal cultures and traditions. Such commonality, however, does 
not preordain the way a legal tradition captures this tension in theoretical 
terms and doctrinal concepts. In this context, I have been asked to answer 
a concrete and concise question: Do the common law and civilian tradi-
tions differ in their approach to the relationship between rights and 
remedies, and if so, how?  
 This is not a simple inquiry, and it is even less simple, it seems to me, 
to find an answer that will do it justice. If a comparative lawyer were 
asked to boil down the complexities to a single catchphrase the answer 
would probably look something like this: in the common law the remedy is 
said to precede the right, ubi remedium, ibi ius; whereas in the civil law 
                                                  
1   An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2009 annual conference of the Ca-
nadian Institute for the Administration of Justice (“Taking Remedies Seriously”). I 
would like to thank Robert J Sharpe J for his kind invitation. The participants of the 
first panel (“Private Law and the Remedial Imagination: The Relationship between 
Rights and Remedies”), which was chaired by Robert J Sharpe, were called upon to re-
spond to specific questions. My co-panellist Stephen A Smith addressed the question 
“Are rights and remedies properly understood as discrete and distinct elements or are 
they inextricably bound? Why does the nature of the right-remedy relationship matter?” 
I had been asked to introduce a comparative angle and to address the question “Do the 
common law and civilian traditions differ in their approach to the relationship between 
rights and remedies, and if so, how?”  
2   Paul Gewirtz, “Remedies and Resistance” (1983) 92:4 Yale LJ 585 at 587.  
3   Describing a kind of judicial decision-making that does not follow a rational grid of pre-
formulated rules and principles, Max Weber famously popularized the expression 
“Kadi-justice”: Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 
ed by Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) 
vol 2, 976 [emphasis in original] (using the expression, as has been pointed out by 
scholars of Islamic law, in a proverbial rather than an historically accurate way). 
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the right is said to precede the remedy, ubi ius, ibi remedium.4 Despite 
the apparent triteness of this summary, I maintain that there is not only 
truth to this aphorism, but that it stands as a synecdoche for a fundamen-
tal epistemological difference between the common law and the civil law 
traditions—a diagnosis that begs the further question: how does a mixed 
jurisdiction such as Quebec position itself in relation to this dichotomy?  
 The different answers given to the question whether rights “come be-
fore the remedies”5 (or vice versa) reflect a difference in how common law-
yers and civilians imagine, conceptualize, and think about law. Despite 
phenomena of “functional convergence”, cultural differences that burden 
the communication between lawyers on both sides of the common law–
civil law divide remain.6 Notably, the civilian tradition approaches law not 
as a historical sequence of court-ordered sanctions affecting the life of the 
disputants, but as an abstract normative system to be treated in a “scien-
tific” manner.  
 However, before even asking whether there is something such as an 
approach to the rights-remedies relationship that is typical of the common 
or civil law tradition, we first have to find out whether the respective tra-
ditions are even equally familiar with the notions of “rights” and “reme-
dies”. On the one hand, it is well known that comparatists have main-
tained that the common law has traditionally entertained a notion of right 
in a private law context that deviates from the (in)famous Continental 
“subjective right”—droit subjectif or subjektives Recht.7 On the other hand, 
we witness a certain helplessness that overcomes the “true” civilian when 
grappling with the common law concept of “remedy” in all its historical 
                                                  
4   See e.g. William Tetley, “Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v Civil Law (Codified and 
Uncodified)” (2000) 60:3 La L Rev 677 at 707; Éric Descheemaker, “Faut-il codifier le 
droit privé européen des contrats?” (2002) 47:4 McGill LJ 791 at 808; Denis Tallon, 
“L’inexécution du contrat: pour une autre présentation” [1994] RTD civ (2d) 223 at 224; 
René David & John EC Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An Introduc-
tion to the Comparative Study of Law, 3d ed (London: Stevens & Sons, 1985) 316-17; 
Geoffrey Samuel, Law of Obligations and Legal Remedies, 2d ed (London: Cavendish, 
2001) at 90 [Samuel, “Legal Remedies”]; JA Jolowicz, On Civil Procedure (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 83.  
5   The question cannot be viewed as a matter of historical or even logical precedence; the 
question of which precedes the other, approached in such an ontological manner, re-
sembles the question of which comes first: the chicken or the egg. See Rafal Zakrzewski, 
Remedies Reclassified (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 57. 
6   See e.g. Pierre Legrand, “European Legal Systems Are Not Converging” (1996) 45:1 
ICLQ 52 at 60ff.  
7   Geoffrey Samuel, “‘Le Droit Subjectif’ and English Law” (1987) 46:2 Cambridge LJ 264 
[Samuel, “English Law”]; FH Lawson, “‘Das subjektive Recht’ in the English Law of 
Torts” in Many Laws: Selected Essays, vol 1 (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1977) 176 
[Lawson, “Das subjektive Recht”]. 
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and theoretical implications; used to thinking within a framework that 
strictly categorizes terms like substance and procedure, subjective right, 
and action and execution, the concept of remedies remains a mystery to 
the civilian. The French civilian Denis Tallon once remarked at the outset 
of a report on remedies for breach of contract that “the French reporter is 
confronted with a terminological difficulty which, as always, reflects a 
more fundamental problem: what is a ‘remedy’?”8 The French recours, 
which is translated in the English language version of the Civil Code of 
Québec as “remedy”9 or the German Rechtsbehelf, seem prima vista, to de-
scribe legal institutions of which one can avail oneself—rather than a 
remedy in the sense of a cure that it is administered by a court.10 Such 
fundamental differences—terminological, conceptual, epistemological—
foreshadow the problems a Quebec judge or practitioner of private law 
faces when operating within a framework of substantive law that is civil-
ian and a law of procedure that is strongly influenced by the common law.  
II. Remedies and Rights in the Common Law 
 Our first task is to briefly outline the approach of “the” common law 
tradition to the rights-remedies relationship. We have to differentiate be-
tween an empirical, factual description of how the common law tradition 
has dealt with this problem in its history, and what legal theorists and 
philosophers have argued ought to be the proper answer to the eternal 
question of how rights relate to remedies. Both approaches, however, are 
made even more complicated by the fact that it is far from clear what a 
remedy actually is.  
A. Traditional Pragmatism and the “Remedial Approach” 
 Common lawyers tend—proudly—to portray themselves as gravitat-
ing towards a pragmatist approach. Unlike the civilian, who is more aca-
demically inclined and weighed down by doctrinal theorization, the com-
mon lawyer has traditionally cared about what actually matters; he em-
phasizes outcome, actual results rather than idle theory. In the context of 
a civil action, what matters is, arguably, the remedy. In his 1955 article 
                                                  
8   Denis Tallon, “Remedies: French Report” in Donald Harris & Denis Tallon, eds, Con-
tract Law Today: Anglo-French Comparisons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) 
263 at 263 [Tallon, “Remedies”] [emphasis added].  
9   See e.g. arts 484, 593, 1397, 1477, 1491, 1529, 1532, 1534, 1535, 1560, 1624, 1625, 1669, 
1692, 1955, 2017, 2055, 2181, 2204 CCQ But see arts 1743, 1863 CCQ. The Civil Code 
of Québec uses “remedy” in the sense of a remedial right rather than in the sense of 
court order. 
10   For further details, see Part III.1(b), below. 
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“The Law of Remedies as a Social Institution” Professor Charles Wright 
wrote, “Civil actions are not brought to vindicate nice theories as to negli-
gence or nuisance or consideration.”11 The tone of this quote, as well as 
the title of Wright’s essay, gives us a sense of the appeal the topic of 
remedies exerts on a jurisprudence that would rather look at outcomes 
and consequences than preoccupy itself with doctrinal minutiae. Reme-
dies, in the sense of that which matters, are the topic of choice of the real-
ist and the pragmatist.12 This explains the proliferation of courses, case-
books, and textbooks, as well as scholarly works on remedies, particularly 
in the United States in the second half of the twentieth century.  
 The rest of the common law world, however, could not resist the at-
traction either; in 1983, Professor Waddams pointed out the growing in-
terest in the “legal subject” of remedies, expressed in the production of 
books and articles and the offering of courses.13 And is it not a hallmark of 
the English common law tradition that it “typically ... fastens, not upon 
principles but upon remedies”?14 Prima facie, this observation seems to 
hold true as well regarding the relationship, as traditionally understood, 
between remedies and rights. Despite the plethora of theoretical ques-
tions that spring to mind when reflecting even perfunctorily on the rela-
tionship between remedies and rights—after what we have learned so 
far—we can surmise that common lawyers engage in such theoretical dis-
cussions with rather curbed enthusiasm.15 P.S. Atiyah writes, “English 
law has for long prided itself in being strong on remedies, even if it is less 
interested in rights.”16 
 The reason for this tendency is usually said to be found in the history 
and structure of the common law. The common law developed within a 
procedural framework of causes of actions—a structure, interestingly 
                                                  
11   Charles Alan Wright, (1955) 18:4 U Det LJ 376 at 377.  
12   FH Lawson, Remedies of English Law, 2d ed (London: Buttersworth, 1980) at 1. 
13   SM Waddams, “Remedies as a Legal Subject” (1983) 3:1 Oxford J Legal Stud 113 at 
113. 
14   Davy v Spelthorne BC, [1984] 1 AC 262 at 276, [1983] 3 WLR 742 (HL), Wilberforce LJ.  
15   See also Albert Kiralfy, “Law and Right in English Legal History” (1985) 6:1 J Legal 
Hist 49. Kiralfy assesses that “[t]he attitude of the English lawyer towards his law as 
an institution independent of the machinery of its creation is ambiguous” (ibid at 49). 
16   PS Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory in English Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1987) at 
21. See also, on the historical usage of “right” in English common law history; Kiralfy, 
supra note 15 at 57-60; Lawson notes that English lawyers, though using the term 
right, usually do not attach to it some form of metaphysical significance (“Das subjek-
tive Recht”, supra note 7 at 177).  
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enough, phenotypically very close to classical Roman law.17 Roman law, 
however, observed a different kind of taxonomical logic, which in turn 
provided the syntax for a Continental legal science that eventually devel-
oped the strict separation between substance and procedure.18 In the Eng-
lish common law, it was not until the abolition of the Common Law Pro-
cedure Act of 1852 that the question of a division between substance and 
procedure became an issue of practical relevance.19 Although the theoreti-
cal separation between procedure and substance exists in common law 
thought, “when it comes to remedies,” as Geoffrey Samuel observed, “this 
distinction can break down as a result of the legacy of the forms of action 
which themselves defined substantive ideas mainly through formal rules 
of procedure.”20 Scholarly attempts at theoretical elucidation notwith-
standing, in light of this legacy, traditional discourse (a) was more likely 
to develop a rhetoric that focused on the actual relief, the remedy to cure 
the plaintiff’s grievance, granted by a judge; and (b) had no need to engage 
in a clear distinction between substance and procedure when it came to 
remedies.21 This is seen—by some—as the very character of common law 
remedies: “The law of remedies falls somewhere between substance and 
procedure, distinct from both but overlapping with both,” as Douglas Lay-
cock put it.22 
B. Remedies and Rights: The Theoretical Debate 
 This narrative may appear as an accurate description of the tradi-
tional way the common law approached the relationship between right 
and remedy (which displayed, as Atiyah has reminded us, a certain lack of 
interest in the definition of substantive rights); yet, many authors would 
disagree that this is an accurate description of how remedies ought to be 
                                                  
17   Although not accurate on all accounts, the locus classicus for this observation is Fritz 
Pringsheim, “The Inner Relationship Between English and Roman Law” (1935) 5:3 
Cambridge LJ 347. 
18   For a more detailed reflection on this topic, see Part II, below. 
19   Common Law Procedure Act, 1852 (UK), 15 & 16 Vic, c 76. Of course, “[t]he final blow 
was struck by the Judicature Act of 1873”: FW Maitland, The Forms of Actions at 
Common Law: A Course of Lectures, ed by AH Chaytor & WJ Whittaker (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1936) at 8. See also Geoffrey Samuel, “Public and Private 
Law: A Private Lawyer’s Response” (1983) 46:5 Mod L Rev 558, 562ff; Jolowicz, supra 
note 4 at 83, n 7.  
20   Samuel, “Legal Remedies”, supra note 4 at 40. 
21   Lawson, “Das subjektive Recht”, supra note 7 at 178.  
22   Douglas Laycock, Modern American Remedies: Cases and Materials, 3d ed (New York: 
Aspen, 2002) at 1. See generally Doug Rendleman, “Remedies—The Law School 
Course” (2001) 39:3 Brandeis LJ 535 at 535; David M Walker, The Law of Civil Reme-
dies in Scotland (Edinburgh: W Green & Son, 1974) at v.  
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perceived. We need to remind ourselves that, as comparatists, confronted 
with the question of how “the” common law tradition approaches the 
rights-remedies relationship, we need to distinguish carefully between an 
empirical and a normative answer to this question, between what seems 
to be an adequate empirical description of common law discourse and the 
postulates of legal theorists as to how remedies—and their relationships 
to rights—ought to be understood.  
1. Rights in Private Law Discourse 
 First of all, we have to be mindful not to fall prey to the stereotype 
that “the” common law has not been or is not interested in rights. The 
common law is obviously familiar with a private law discourse of rights.23 
Particularly in recent times, the rights-side of the rights-remedies dichot-
omy has attracted more and more attention that has elicited not only aca-
demic but also important judicial statements. A prominent example comes 
to mind: Lord Diplock’s famous distinction between primary and secon-
dary rights and obligations arising from a contract, his subtle sub-
distinctions as to the different species of primary rights, and the implica-
tions for the administration of remedies.24  
 The fact that we encounter the distinction between “primary rights” 
and “sanctioning rights” (secondary rights arising from “civil delicts”) in 
the work of John Austin, underlines that English jurisprudence does in-
deed have a longstanding tradition of focusing on the role of rights in pri-
vate law and their relationship to remedies.25 The term right might not 
come with the same semantic implications as droit subjectif (insofar as it 
does not emphasize or imply an antagonism of subjective and objective); 
right might also not range as high in the metaphysical pantheon of con-
cepts as droit subjectif does in the civil law tradition. However, although it 
is popular to point out that there is no such thing as the civilian droit sub-
jectif or subjektives Recht in the common law, we must be careful not to 
deny the significance of rights in the common law discourse of private 
                                                  
23   For a historical perspective, see Kiralfy, supra note 15 at 57-60.  
24   See e.g. Lep Air Services Ltd v Rolloswin Investments Ltd, [1973] AC 331 at 350, [1972] 
2 WLR 1175 (HL); Hardwick Game Farm v Suffolk Agricultural and Poultry Producers 
Association Ltd [1966] 1 WLR 287, 1 All ER 309 (CA); C Czarnikow Ltd v Koufos (The 
Heron II), [1966] 2 QB 695, 2 WLR 1397 (CA). See also Brice Dickson, “The Contribu-
tion of Lord Diplock to the General Law of Contract” (1989) 9:4 Oxford J Legal Stud 441 
at 448. 
25   C.f. John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence: Or the Philosophy of Positive Law, 5th ed 
by Robert Campbell (London: John Murray, 1885) vol 2 at 760ff. 
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law.26 Since the days of Hale and Blackstone,27 English jurists map out 
private law by squaring two dichotomies: rights and wrongs28 on the one 
hand and rights and remedies on the other.29  
 With the recent rise of remedies as a popular topic in academia, legal 
theorists in the Commonwealth have shown a renewed interest in the 
rights-remedies relationship: traditionally not quite so smitten with the 
pragmatist stance fairly common among legal scholars in the United 
States, they have reacted to the popularity of “remedies as a legal subject” 
by aiming at theoretical explanations of how remedies relate to rights.30 
The works of Peter Birks, Robert Stevens, Lionel Smith, Stephen Smith, 
and Ernest Weinrib (to name just a few) stand witness to this academic 
interest in a rights-based theory of remedies.31 This, of course, fits into the 
                                                  
26   Samuel states: “[n]o doubt for the Continental lawyer the subjective right has always 
had at bottom the politico-legal flavour which is only now becoming more overt in Eng-
lish case-law” (“English Law”, supra note 7 at 266). I would rather venture to say that 
the Continental private lawyer perceives the “subjective right” as part of the technical 
arsenal of private law doctrine, without much more flavour (or haut-goût) than “right” 
to the common lawyer.  
27   See Sir Matthew Hale, The History of the Common Law of England, And An Analysis of 
the Civil Part of the Law, 6th ed by Charles Runnington (London: Butterworth, 1820); 
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: A Facsimile of the First 
Edition of 1765-1763 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975) vol 1 [Blackstone, 
Commentaries, vol 1]. For a particular reading of the rights-wrongs and rights-remedies 
distinction, c.f. Alan Watson, “The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries” (1988) 97:5 
Yale LJ 795 (explaining the influence of Hale’s work, and of continental Roman law 
scholarship). 
28   See Blackstone, Commentaries, vol 1, supra note 27 at 117ff. “Right,” in this context, is 
at first not used in the sense of an individual entitlement, but in the sense of a state of 
what is right. A similar ambivalence can be observed in the usage of ius  in Roman law: 
see Donahue, infra note 83. 
29   Blackstone actually states that whenever a right is invaded, there is a remedy: William 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: A Facsimile of the First Edition of 
1765-1769 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979) vol 3 at 23ff [Blackstone, Com-
mentaries, vol 3]. Note, however, that Blackstone did not yet think in the terms of Aus-
tin’s secondary rights—Blackstone’s concept of rights remains, as Birks called it, “su-
perstructural” (Peter Birks, “Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies” (2000) 20:1 Oxford J Legal 
Stud 1 at 5 [Birks, “Rights, Wrongs”]). 
30   C.f. Neil Duxbury, “English Jurisprudence Between Austin and Hart” (2005) 91:1 Va L 
Rev 1 at 55. 
31   See e.g. Birks, “Rights, Wrongs”, supra note 29; Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Lionel Smith, “Restitution: The Heart of Correc-
tive Justice” (2001) 79:7 Tex L Rev 2115; Stephen A Smith, “The Law of Damages: 
Rules for Citizens or Rules for Courts?” in Dajkhongir Saidov & Ralph Cunnington, eds, 
Contract Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives (Oxford: Hart, 2008) 33 
[Smith, “Damages”]; Stephen A Smith, “The Rights of Private Law” in Andrew Robert-
son & Tang Hang Wu, eds, The Goals of Private Law (Oxford: Hart, 2009) 113 [Smith, 
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bigger picture of a private law discourse that, contrary to American utili-
tarianism, is taking rights seriously and is trying to ground the positive 
law in a theory of rights.32 If we take account of the amount of scholarly 
writing produced, it seems fair to say that, in this day and age, there ex-
ists a more vivid academic discourse on the topic of rights—and their rela-
tionship to remedies—in common law jurisdictions than in the civil law 
world. Furthermore, the theories offered by scholars such as Weinrib and 
Smith aim at explaining the “true” character of private law through a 
rights-based approach; if we take these scholars by their word, if we do 
take the rights-based theories seriously, we cannot simply stick to the cli-
ché that the common law is concerned with remedies rather than rights.  
2. The Quest for a Rights-Remedies Taxonomy 
 Instead of giving a detailed account of the sophisticated theories on 
the rights-remedies relationship, I shall briefly depict—in a rather simple 
manner—the intellectual landscape of those theories as a continuum that 
spans from an extreme remedial approach at one end to an extreme 
rights-based approach at the other. For the purpose of our inquiry, this 
exercise is important insofar as it will show that the theoretical stand-
point determines the respective definitions of remedies and rights—which 
is, as we will see, a valuable insight for our comparative project.  
 Let us start with the remedies end of the continuum. It is, at the same 
time, the pragmatist pole. Here the remedy defines the right; the right 
has no ontological existence as a “valid” deontic command. A “right” is 
simply the word used to describe a factual position that is protected by in-
stitutional safeguards, such as court orders: “‘Right,’ pragmatically, thus 
means ‘remedy.’”33 In its simplest and purest form, this view has of course 
been expounded by O.W. Holmes, who argued against an understanding 
of the law as a system of “pre-existing” rights and duties as deontic enti-
ties: “The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more 
pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”34 The remaining importance of 
      
“Rights”]; Ernest J Weinrib, “Two Conceptions of Remedies” in Charles EF Rickett, ed, 
Justifying Private Law Remedies (Oxford: Hart, 2008) 3. 
32   See e.g. Ernest J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1995); Stephen A Smith, Contract Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004) [Smith, “Contract Theory”]; Smith, “Rights,” supra note 31, passim. 
33   David Stevens, “Restitution, Property, and the Cause of Action in Unjust Enrichment: 
Getting by with Fewer Things” (1989) 39:3 UTLJ 258 at 285 [emphasis in original]. 
34   OW Holmes, “The Path of the Law” (1897) 10:8 Harvard L Rev 457 at 462. Holmes is of-
ten presented as a radical, a maverick; however, along the same lines, see Arthur L 
Corbin, “Legal Analysis and Terminology” (1919) 29:2 Yale LJ 163 at 164:  
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such legal consequentialism lies obviously in breaking the path for effi-
ciency-oriented theories of law, which represent some of the most influen-
tial strains of contemporary legal thought, particularly in the United 
States.35 Returning to our rights-remedies discourse, this approach, in the 
terminology suggested by Grant Hammond, could be called “monist”. In 
such a remedial monism right is mostly eclipsed and consumed by rem-
edy.36 The remedy is what matters; saying that there was a right is just 
another way of saying that a remedy has actually been granted.  
 At the other end of the continuum, however, the concept of right 
reigns supreme. Since the remedial monist is unconcerned with rights as 
a category, there is simply no need for a sharp definition of remedy. Ac-
knowledging the importance of rights, however, leads to the necessity to 
define both concepts in their relationship to each other. We could think of 
a rights monism that dispenses with remedy as a meaningful category al-
together: when rights alone matter, remedy can be seen as a non-
technical term to describe every response of the legal system to some sort 
of grievance in need of a cure, be it substantive or procedural in nature.  
 Peter Birks has argued against such use of the terminology: wherever 
the law grants a right, it should be called by its proper name—also in 
matters terminological, right should prevail over remedy.37 In search of a 
remaining technical meaning of remedy, thus acknowledging a theoretical 
dichotomy or “dualism”38 of right and remedy, it is only natural to define 
remedy narrowly in a way that leaves matters of substance to the concept 
of right and relegates remedy to its factual implementation. Smith and 
Zakrzewski, accordingly, define remedy as court orders.39 The rights-
based approach seems to gravitate towards a procedural understanding of 
      
When we state that some particular legal relation exists we are impliedly as-
serting the existence of certain facts, and we are expressing our present men-
tal concept of the societal consequences that will normally follow in the future. 
A statement that a legal relation exists between A and B is a prediction as to 
what society, acting through its courts or executive agents, will do or not do for 
one and against the other.  
35   See Richard A Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 2003) at 76-79. 
36   Grant Hammond, “Rethinking Remedies: The Changing Conception of the Relationship 
between Legal and Equitable Remedies” in Jeffrey Berryman, ed, Remedies: Issues and 
Perspectives (Scarborough, Ont: Carswell, 1991) 87 at 90. 
37   Birks, “Rights, Wrongs”, supra note 29 at 19-22.  
38   C.f. Hammond, supra note 36 at 90-91. 
39   Zakrzewski, supra note 5 at 43. See also Stephen A Smith, “Rights and Remedies: A 
Complex Relationship” in Robert J Sharpe & Kent Roach, eds, Taking Remedies Seri-
ously (Montreal: Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, 2010) 31 at 34; 
Smith, “Contract Theory”, supra note 32 at 388.  
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remedy, and towards a substance-procedure divide. In its most extreme 
formulation, remedies could be understood simply as rubber stamps on 
the decision made by substantive law. The impetus of Peter Birks’s work 
seems, at times, to point in this direction.40 
 We shall not be concerned with the many other definitions that try to 
reconcile the concepts of right and remedy; suffice it here to outline the 
two most extreme theoretical positions.41 To have those roles inform our 
“remedial imagination” helps us to set the stage for the second part of our 
inquiry: the civilian way of approaching rights and—if there is such a 
thing—remedies. Returning to our caveat about the normative and the 
empirical assessment of the common law approach, we can sum up as fol-
lows. The relationship between rights and remedies remains a matter of 
scholarly contention. We saw that in the ongoing theoretical debate a 
remedies-based monism and a rights-based dualism can be depicted as 
the two opposite poles of a continuum. It is not our task to answer the 
normative question of which approach is, as a matter of legal theory, the 
most consistent and convincing. Called upon as comparatists to give an 
assessment of the common law approach, the model of the continuum of 
theoretically possible approaches helps us to visualize what, empirically, 
can be considered the position of traditional common law discourse. Even 
if we concede that the common law had historically had more difficulties 
than the civilian tradition in embracing the “subjective right”,42 it was still 
rather comfortable with “duties”43 and therefore is not at all completely 
agnostic regarding norms as pre-existing deontic entities. However, it is 
fair to say that common law pragmatism and its traditional thinking in 
terms of causes of actions has been biased towards the remedies-end of 
the continuum. Thus Vice Chancellor Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson (as 
he then was) described the relationship between common law pragmatism 
and the position of a “remedial monism” in 1986: 
In the pragmatic way in which English law has developed, a man’s 
legal rights are in fact those which are protected by a cause of action. 
                                                  
40   See text accompanying note 122; Birks, “Rights, Wrongs”, supra note 29. 
41   See e.g. Yehuda Adar & Gabriela Shalev, “The Law of Remedies in a Mixed Jurisdic-
tion: The Israeli Experience” (2008) 23 Tul Eur & Civ LF 111 (defining remedy as “an 
entitlement, i.e. a legal right,” while, at the same time, “[f]rom the standpoint of the 
person entitled to the remedy (the aggrieved party), a remedy involves a practical bene-
fit or advantage, awarded him for the sake of alleviating the grievance” at 114). 
42   See e.g. Samuel, “English Law”, supra note 7, passim. 
43   See Atiyah, supra note 16 at 18. See also Lionel Smith, “Understanding Specific Per-
formance” in Nili Cohen & Ewan McKendrick, eds, Comparative Remedies for Breach of 
Contract (Oxford: Hart, 2005) 221. Smith points out that OW Holmes—in the same ar-
ticle in which he denounces a deontic concept of right—spoke of a duty to perform a con-
tract in case of specific performance being an available remedy (ibid at 223-24). 
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It is not in accordance, as I understand it, with the principles of Eng-
lish law to analyse rights as being something separate from the 
remedy given to the individual.44 
This pragmatism is not the pragmatism so dear to American theorists, in 
the sense of a philosophical denomination or a strain of legal theory.45 It is 
a theoretically rather unreflective (and therefore probably the only truly 
pragmatic) pragmatism—the kind displayed by judges confronted with 
real cases, which leads to a kind of visceral “remedial monism”.  
 Another valuable insight is that the common law theorists who gravi-
tate towards the rights-end of the continuum are those who are inspired 
by the civil law. This is particularly obvious in the case of Peter Birks 
who, as a Romanist, has often expressed his affinity for the neatness of ci-
vilian taxonomic thinking.46 This is an insight that finally leads our path 
to the civil law: it is indeed civilian taxonomy that hands us the key to 
understanding the main differences between the common law and the 
civil law approach to the rights-remedies relationship, which is, first of 
all, characterized, as we have seen, by the absence of remedy as a mean-
ingful category in civilian private law discourse.47  
III. The Civil Law: Rights and their Procedural Realization 
A. Rights and Actions, not Rights and Remedies  
1. Theoretical Structure: Procedure as the “Servant” of Substantive Law 
 Civilian private law discourse is traditionally centred upon the notion 
of the subjective right. The implications for our inquiry could be tenta-
tively described as follows: all allocative decisions that private law is sup-
posed to make—what belongs to whom and who owes what to whom—can 
eventually be expressed through a discourse of rights (entitlements, obli-
gations, duties, and so forth).48 These decisions are perceived as decisions 
of substantive law.  
                                                  
44   Kingdom of Spain v Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd, [1986] 1 WLR 1120 at 1129, 3 ALL 
ER 28. 
45   For a distinction between the two forms of pragmatism, see Posner, supra note 35 at ch 
1 (“Pragmatism—Philosophical versus Everyday”).  
46   See e.g. Peter Birks, “Definition and Division: A Meditation on Institutes 3.13” in Peter 
Birks, ed, The Classification of Obligations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) 1. 
47   See Tallon, “Remedies”, supra note 8. 
48   For the German civil law, see the splendid summary rendered by Wolfgang Zöllner, 
“Materielles Recht und Proze?echt” (1990) 190 Archiv für die Civilistische Praxis 471. 
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 How to now bridge the gap between norms and facts? Because (a) 
those who are on the negative side of (or who are subjected to) a subjective 
right—those under a duty or an obligation—do not always comply with 
their duties’ deontic appeal of their own free accord; and because (b) ex-
cept for narrowly defined cases of self-help, the state holds the monopoly 
on the use of force, the state has to provide an institutional system that 
ensures the enforcement and execution of subjective rights. Whereas sub-
jective rights define the relations of private individuals and therefore 
amount to substantive private law, the body of law governing the admini-
stration of enforcement and execution procedures is a matter of public 
law.49 Substance and procedure are to be strictly kept apart; procedure is 
relegated to the ancillary function of enforcing and executing substantive 
rights:50 the action is the “humble servante du droit subjectif substantiel.”51 
 Except for certain cases, such as dissolving marriage through a consti-
tutive act, a judicial decision does not create a new legal situation,52 but 
rather announces how the pre-existing legal relationship between the par-
ties has to be properly understood.53 Therefore, within the grid of the 
strict taxonomic separation of substantive law and procedure, the dichot-
omy that matters from the perspective of someone intent on enforcing her 
rights is not that of right and remedy, but that of right and action.  
 It goes without saying that this description is an oversimplification. 
Furthermore, we must not forget that the common law tradition, as men-
tioned above, separates substance and procedure as well, and is even fa-
miliar with the imagery of “servility”; as Lord Collins M.R. famously re-
marked: “the relation of the rules of practice to the work of justice is in-
      
For France, see Serge Guinchard, Frédérique Ferrand & Cécile Chainais, Procédure 
Civile: Droit interne et droit communautaire, 29th ed (Paris: Dalloz, 2008) at paras 86ff. 
49   See e.g. René Morel, Traité élémentaire de procédure civile, 2d ed (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 
1949) at 6ff. For a more subtle distinction, however, see Loïc Cadiet & Emmanuel Jeu-
land, Droit judiciaire privé, 5th ed (Paris: Litec, 2006) at para 11.  
50   Gérard Cornu & Jean Foyer, Procédure civile (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1958) at 6. The role of procedure as a servant of substantive law is also underlined by 
Cadiet & Jeuland, supra note 49 at paras 8ff; Henry Solus & Roger Perrot, Droit judi-
ciaire privé, t 1 (Paris: Sirey, 1961) at para 15. 
51   Henri Motulsky, Écrits: études et notes de procédure civile (Paris: Dalloz, 1973) at 100 
[emphasis added]. See also Cornu & Foyer, supra note 50 at 11.  
52   And even in cases where a judicial decision does create a new legal situation, it does so 
because substantive law ascribes this function to the judicial decision. 
53   A theorist might want to engage in a discussion on the question of whether the nature 
of the pre-existing right changes due to the approval of the court by means of novation, 
etc. The court order does command special respect, different rules of prescription apply, 
etc. For the English common law, see Birks, “Rights, Wrong”, supra note 29 at 15.  
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tended to be that of handmaid rather than mistress”.54 Yet, as we have al-
ready seen, when it comes to the relationship of rights and remedies, the 
distinction is not easy to uphold—the separation of substance and proce-
dure tends to “break down”,55 as Geoffrey Samuel put it, when common 
lawyers try to analyze what happens when a court administers a remedy.  
 Let us assume that, in contrast, the axiomatic starting point of the 
civil law is indeed a paradigm of rubber stamping; the role of the court, 
and of the law of procedure, is mainly to grant official verification to the 
existence of subjective rights, if need be through the use of force exerted 
by the state. Even if the rights of the disputants are far from easily dis-
cernable before proceedings are instigated—which is what usually brings 
people to court in the first place—the court only “finds” that substantive, 
pre-existing rights-duties relationships exist from the time of the occur-
rence of whatever causative event gave rise to the rights and duties in 
question. The body of public law that governs bringing an action has noth-
ing to say as to the justification of the underlying substantive claim; the 
substantive law, in turn, is purged from all procedural implications.  
2. Terminology: The Absence of “Remedy” 
 If we try to locate this approach in our model56 it would occupy the 
most extreme possible position on the rights-end of the continuum. It be-
comes obvious why the civilian is challenged to ascribe a technical mean-
ing to the notion of remedy; within the rights-actions framework there is 
no room for remedy as a technical term that combines features of sub-
stance and procedure.  
 This explains the absence of an exact equivalent in French terminol-
ogy; André Tunc has suggested the use of the non-technical term remède 
as a translation for “remedy”.57 German civil law parlance also lacks an 
equivalent of remedy—Behelf or “Rechtsbehelf”58 could be used as non-
technical terms that could describe both a substantial entitlement as well 
as the possibility to have this right enforced in court. In that sense, reme-
                                                  
54   Re Coles and Ravenshear, [1907] 1 KB 1 at 1, 4, [1907] 23 Times LR 32. 
55   Samuel, “Legal Remedies”, supra note 4 at 40; Laycock, supra note 22. 
56   See Part II.2(b), above. 
57   André Tunc, “Preface” in Claude Lambrechts, ed and translator, Code de Commerce 
Uniforme des États-Unis (Paris: Armand Colin, 1971) at 17. 
58   For example, Rechtsbehelf is used as the translation of “remedy” in the official German 
language version of the CISG, see Übereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen über Vertäge 
über den internationalen Warenkauf, Bundesgesetzblatt 1989 II, 588 at 599. However, 
Rechtsbehelf is more commonly found in procedural terminology, signifying any means 
of realizing a right within the framework of orderly procedure.  
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dium only has a place in civil law thinking in its broadest and most non-
distinct denotation: the idea of remedium as cure that refers to any re-
sponse of the legal system to a grievance—a definition explicitly rejected 
by Birks for common law usage.59 However, since the Continental civil law 
does not think in the terms of the Blackstonian rights-wrongs-remedies 
taxonomy (if a right is invaded, there is a wrong, which will be rectified by 
granting a remedy), the realization of a right is not seen as remedying a 
wrong—a cure that is being granted, administered by a court.60 Rechtsbe-
helf, for example, also differs from remedy insofar as it denotes something 
of which one avails oneself: it is the means one uses to help oneself (sich 
behelfen) in order to obtain relief, rather than the cure (or remedy) itself.  
 In recent years, French authors have suggested using a common law–
inspired remedial language (remèdes) when looking at the consequences of 
the non-execution of a contract.61 The purpose was to break out of the 
taxonomic mould of the Code civil, assume a more pragmatist perspective, 
and ask what can be done for the creditor if the contract is not performed 
properly.62 The remedial perspective and the remedial language used is an 
indicator of a civilian attempt to think more like a consequentialist, and 
more like a common lawyer. But beware of this apparent equivalence: de-
spite the more consequentialist perspective, remedy as used in this way is 
merely a synonym of right or maybe remedial right, which lacks the pro-
cedural implications of remedy in common law parlance.  
 Thus, if we encounter the language of remedy in a civil law context, it 
is not to be understood as an analogue of the common law term remedy, 
particularly if it is supposed to signify a technically defined concept. If we 
encounter remedial language, in many instances it indicates that common 
law mentality has seeped into civilian thinking. One example is the re-
cently published Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Pri-
vate Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference, Interim Outline Edition”.63 
                                                  
59   See Birks, “Rights, Wrongs”, supra note 29 at 19ff.  
60   See Hale, supra note 27; Blackstone, Commentaries, vol 1, supra note 27. 
61   Denis Tallon, “L’inexécution du contrat: pour une autre présentation” [1994] RTD civ 
223; Sophie LeGac-Pech, “Vers un droit des remèdes” (2007) 242 Petites Affiches 7. 
62   See especially ibid.  
63   Christian von Bar et al, eds, (Munich: Sellier, 2008). For a recent critical assessment, 
see e.g. Horst Eidenmüller et al, “The Common Frame of Reference for European Pri-
vate Law: Policy Choices and Codification Problems” (2008) 28:4 Oxford J Legal Stud 
659. For the politics of European private law and contract law harmonization, c.f. EC, 
Commission, A More Coherent European Contract Law: An Action Plan (Bruxelles, 
2003). See also Hugh Beale, “The Future of the Common Frame of Reference” (2007) 3:3 
ERCL 257; Gert Brüggemeier et al, “Social Justice in European Contract Law: a Mani-
festo” (2004) 10:6 Eur LJ 653; Martijn W Hesselink, “The Politics of a European Civil 
Code” (2004) 10:6 Eur LJ 675. 
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Much has been written about its adoption of a civilian style of codification 
and a “German” sense of formalism.64 However, its use of the language of 
remedies in Book Three, Chapter Three (“Remedies for Non-
Performance”),65 for example, can be traced back to earlier attempts to 
bridge the gap between civilian and common law thinking. The most 
prominent example of this ancestry is the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG),66 which speaks of 
“remedies for breach of contract”67 and thus openly refers to the common 
law terminology and conceptualization of the non- or mal-performance of 
a contract. The CISG has exerted influence on the drafting and interpre-
tation of the continental national codifications as well.68 Surely this kind 
of cross-fertilization promotes “convergence”, since using the terminology 
of a different legal tradition will open legal discourse to the ideas of the 
other. For now, however, we can summarize that remedy, as a technical 
term, does not fit well in the civilian dichotomy of substance and proce-
dure, of right and action. Given this clear-cut separation of substance and 
procedure, the civil law has no room for an overlapping grey area that 
could amount to the “legal subject of remedies”. The technocratic taxon-
omy of the civil law lacks the “remedial imagination” for such a fabulous 
chimera. 
B. Origins 
 How do we account for this difference? Without postulating a simple 
relation of causality, we can link the position of the civil law tradition to 
the idiosyncrasies of its historical development. Again, we can only at-
tempt to describe the tendency of the mainstream; in the civil law tradi-
                                                  
64   See e.g. Antoni Vaquer, “Farewell to Windscheid? Legal Concepts Present and Absent 
from the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)” (2009) 17:4 ERPL 487. See also 
Pierre Legrand, “Antivonbar” (2006) 1:1 J Comp L 13.  
65   Von Bar et al, supra note 63 at 157ff. “Annex 1: Definitions” does not render a definition 
of remedy (ibid at 327ff). However, the definition of right mentions remedy: Right de-
pending on the context, may mean “an entitlement to a particular remedy (as in a right 
to have performance of a contractual obligation judicially ordered)” (ibid at 341). How-
ever, at the same time, “the ‘right to avoid’ a contract” (ibid)—also explicitly named as 
an example of a right—due to fraud, coercion etc, is referred to as a remedy (Arts II-
7:215, 7:216 at 133). See also Vaquer, supra note 64 at 495.  
66   11 April 1980, 1489 UNTS 3, Can TS 1992 No 2 [CISG]. On the idea that the language 
of the CISG “spans all legal families” see Bruno Zeller, “International Trade Law—
Problems of Language and Concepts?” (2003) 23:1 JL & Com 39 at 39. 
67   CISG c II, s 3, arts 45ff (“[r]emedies for breach of contract by the seller”); ibid c III, s 3, 
arts 61ff (“[r]emedies for breach of contract by the buyer”).  
68   Peter Schlechtriem, “Basic Structures and General Concepts of the CISG as Models for 
a Harmonisation of the Law of Obligations” (2005) 10 Juridica International 27 at 27-
36.  
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tion, with its prolific production of scholarly writing, there are many ex-
amples of views deviating from this mainstream, but I will be able to 
mention only a few.  
1. A Tradition of Theorization 
 Let us start with the most general—and possibly most banal—
observation. It is common comparative law–textbook fare that the devel-
opment of the civil law has, at least since the renaissance of Roman law in 
the High Middle Ages, coincided with the rise of the university and has 
been driven by learned law professors.69 “The teacher-scholar is the real 
protagonist of the civil law tradition,” as John Merryman put it: “[t]he 
civil law is a law of the professors.”70 Those civil law scholars were by no 
means mere bloodless dwellers of the ivory tower, disconnected from prac-
tice: one of the effects of the scholars’ role as the protagonists of legal de-
velopment has always been their relative proximity to practice. As a mat-
ter of course, judges look at scholarly writing and accept it as authorita-
tive; from the Middle Ages onwards, even towering academic figures such 
as Bartolus and Baldus regularly rendered their expert opinions in civil 
suits.71 Nevertheless, it is easy to imagine that, because civilian discourse 
was propelled from the perspective of the scholar and teacher, its ten-
dency has been far less outcome-oriented or “pragmatic” than the judge-
driven discourse of the common law. This learned discourse, which be-
came more and more infatuated with reason and the idea of law as nor-
mative system,72 tended to approach the rights-remedies conundrum from 
the angle of rights rather than from the angle of practical outcomes, or 
remedies.  
                                                  
69   See e.g. Stephan Kuttner, “The Revival of Jurisprudence” in Robert L Benson, Giles 
Constable & Carol D Lanham, eds, Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1982) at 299ff. 
70   John Henry Merryman & Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition: An Intro-
duction to the Legal Systems of Europe and Latin America, 3d ed (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2007) at 56. See also Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz, Introduction to 
Comparative Law, 3d ed, translated by Tony Weir (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998); RC Van Caenegem, European Law in the Past and the Future: Unity and Diver-
sity over Two Millennia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 44-48 (“[t]he 
English Bench is Paramount” as opposed to “The Continental Professor is Paramount” 
at 44-45). But for tendencies of a “principe de pragmatisme” in French civil law, bring-
ing about a more important role of the judge as well, see William Baranès & Marie-
Anne Frison-Roche, “Le souci de l’effectivité du droit” (1996) D Chron 301. 
71   For an introductory overview, see e.g. Peter Stein, Roman Law in European History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) at 38ff [Stein, “Roman Law”]. 
72   See e.g. Roger Berkowitz, The Gift of Science: Leibniz and the Modern Legal Tradition 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 2005) at 17ff. 
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2. From the Roman Law of Actions to the Rise of the “Subjective Right” 
 The trajectory of this development might nonetheless be somewhat 
surprising given that the continental civil law developed within the 
framework of Roman law. Roman law—classical Roman law, that is—is 
said to be an “actional law”.73 Lacking a clear-cut distinction between sub-
stance and procedure, it does not distinguish between substantive right or 
claim, on the one hand, and procedural implementation or realization, on 
the other hand. Substantive entitlement was determined by the availabil-
ity of a procedural remedy and took the form of the respective actio.74 
What mattered was the availability of a formula—indeed, ubi remedium, 
ibi ius.75 As we have seen, this prevalence of procedure has long inspired 
scholars to point out the parallels between classical Roman law and the 
common law—given its roots in the system of writs; the similarity be-
tween writs and formulae seems simply too obvious to be ignored.76  
 Which path leads from such a way of thinking to the views of modern 
civil law? Looking at the development of the civil law tradition, we ob-
serve that there are two intertwined processes that both contribute to the 
modern primacy of substantive law: the growing conceptual separation of 
substance and procedure in legal thought, and the development of the 
concept of subjective right. It is a matter of contention whether the roots 
of both processes can be traced back to classical Roman law. Despite its 
actional character, we find texts that seem to imply that the Roman juris-
prudes had already devised some concept of substance taking precedence 
over actional realization. The famous Celsus-fragment 44.7.51 in Justin-
ian’s Digest states that:  
Nihil aliud est actio, quam ius quod sibi debeatur, iudicio perse-
quendi.  
An action is nothing else but the right to recover what is owed to us 
by means of a judicial proceeding [translated by author]. 
This is remarkable in two ways: Celsus refers to the actio as ius, as right, 
and at the same time conceptualizes the judicial proceedings as something 
to enforce a prior entitlement; he describes the latter not as right, but in 
the passive voice as what is owed. Yet what did Celsus mean by ius? It is 
tempting, from a modern perspective, to read the characteristics of our 
                                                  
73   Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian 
Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) at 6. 
74   See Horst Kaufmann, “Zur Geschichte des aktionenrechtlichen Denkens” (1964) 15 Ju-
ristenzeitung 482. See also Bernhard Windscheid, Die Actio des römischen Civilrechts, 
vom Standpunkte des heutigen Rechts (Düsseldorf: Julius Buddeus, 1856) at 3. 
75   Zimmermann, supra note 73 at 6. 
76   C.f. Pringsheim, supra note 17 at 358 (“the analogy is surprising”).  
96     (2010) 56:1   MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  
 
 
understanding of right into the Roman ius. This modern perspective is, 
however, determined by a framework whose parameters have developed 
over time;77 although the civilian still operates within the syntax of Ro-
man private entitlements—iura in rem et in personam—right now comes 
with a plethora of connotations that centuries of philosophy and theology, 
natural law theory, and political science have amassed. The subjective 
right has different implications in an era that has witnessed the rise of 
the subject, the rise of the individual, and a new definition of the separa-
tion of the public and the private spheres.78  
 Michel Villey has accredited medieval nominalism, and especially the 
thought of William of Ockham, with first having imbued the Roman con-
cept of ius with the idea of granting power to the individual.79 This thesis 
has attracted ample criticism, particularly because of its postulate of a to-
tal, Copernican shift in meaning effected by Ockham and nominalist phi-
losophy. This is contentious because even in classical Roman private law 
the term ius was deployed to denote some kind of individual entitlement, 
and was not solely used in the objective sense of “law”.80  
 This is not the place to inquire into the minutiae of this debate. One 
detail, however, merits closer examination. As in so many learned dis-
putes, the problem lies with the extreme formulation of the opposing posi-
tions. Of course, the rise of nominalism and individualism had to endow 
the idea of an individual entitlement with a whole new gravity and dy-
namic.81 But that does not mean that, to earlier generations of jurists and 
                                                  
77   Brian Tierney, “Villey, Ockham and the Origin of Individual Rights” in John Witte, Jr 
& Frank S Alexander, eds, The Weightier Matters of the Law, Essays on Law and Relig-
ion: A Tribute to Harold J Berman (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988) 1 at 4-5 (“[a]s we are 
so often told nowadays, all language is context-dependent. A legal term deployed in the 
cultural context of ancient Rome cannot have the same range of meanings as the term 
used nowadays (though the meanings may overlap)” at 5 [footnotes omitted]).  
78   For a brief overview of the “academic career” of the term ius, see generally John Finnis, 
Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) at 206-10; Tierney, 
supra note 77 at 21ff, et passim.  
79   Michel Villey, La formation de la pensée juridique moderne: Cours d’histoire de la 
philosophie du droit, 4th ed (Paris: no publisher, 1975) at 225-62 [Villey, “Pensée 
juridique moderne”]; Michel Villey, “L’idée du droit subjectif et les systèmes juridiques 
romains” (1946) 24 Revue historique de droit français & étranger (4th) 201. 
80   Knut Wolfgang Nörr, “Zur Frage des subjektiven Rechts in der mittelalterlichen 
Rechtswissenschaft” in Dieter Medicus, ed, Festschrift für Hermann Lange zum 70. Ge-
burtstag am 24. Januar 1992 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1992) 193 at 193-98; Tierney, 
supra note 77 at 17-21. 
81   See generally Aaron Gurevich, The Origins of European Individualism, translated by 
Katharine Judelson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), at 89-99 et passim. On nominalist phi-
losophy in particular, see Villey, “Pensée juridique moderne”, supra note 79 at 203ff. C.f. 
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to the Romans themselves, ius did not comprise a subjective dimension as 
well (in the sense of right). In short, to the Romans, ius did not exclusively 
denote “law” in an objective sense. This subjective, individual dimension 
may not have had the same metaphysical implications that some writers82 
seem to now ascribe to the term subjective right, but it emphasized the 
structure of private law as composed of relationships between individuals, 
between “subjects”.83 This was the framework for later civilian discourse, 
and surely was a main factor in the development of the concept of subjec-
tive right. Therefore, it is plausible to assume, as Geoffrey Samuel does, 
that a lack of Roman law scholarship in England is one of the reasons why 
the subjective right did not gain a foothold in English legal thought the 
way it did in Continental Europe.84  
 The same holds true for the division of substance and procedure. Clas-
sical Roman law was actional in its approach. However, the Corpus Iuris 
Civilis, in particular the Digest, the source for later civilian Roman law 
scholarship, devotes relatively little space to technical rules of procedure. 
Its discourse—its way of reasoning—rejoiced in proceeding from one hypo-
thetical to the next, pushing an argument more and more to its extreme, 
while completely abstracting the discussed cases from real, decided cases, 
individual facts, and actual procedural settings. This is one of the most 
important differences between ancient Roman law and English common 
law.85 Again, we do not know what kind of separation between substance 
      
H Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law, 3d ed 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 141. 
82   See e.g. Samuel, “English Law”, supra note 7 at 272ff.  
83   See Charles Donahue, Jr, “Ius in the Subjective Sense in Roman Law: Reflections on 
Villey and Tierney” in Domenico Maffei, ed, A Ennio Cortese, (Rome: Cigno, 2001) t 1 
506. Donahue concedes that the Roman jurists did not put much effort into theoretically 
expounding a concept of subjective right, but underlines, by analyzing the usage of ius 
throughout the Digest, that they must have attached some subjective directionality to 
the notion of ius (ibid at 508ff). It is indeed rather obvious that since the very early 
stages of Roman law, there was a concept of an individual entitlement to the vindica-
tion of protected interests. This finding, however, hardly suffices to refute Villey’s ar-
gument—it is hard to imagine that Villey was not aware of this most simple individual-
istic aspect of Roman private law. It is not likely that he was simply “laboring under a 
linguistic fallacy” (ibid at 529); the subjective right he claims to be an invention of the 
Middle Ages is a different concept, and it seems to be a concept devised to describe the 
novel understanding of the individual and its power in the Middle Ages.   
84   Samuel, “English Law”, supra note 7 at 269. 
85   Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society, 
and Its Relation to Modern Ideas (New York: Henry Holt & Co, 1864) at 36-38; WW 
Buckland & Arnold D McNair, Roman Law & Common Law: A Comparison in Outline, 
2d rev ed by FH Lawson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965) at 9ff. 
(“[r]oman common law was built up like ours by argument from case upon case, with 
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and procedure the Romans themselves experienced; we do not know 
whether Celsus’s statement that an action is only the means to pursue 
what is owed to you already stood witness to the development of a theo-
retical dichotomy. However, these tendencies displayed in Roman law dis-
course surely facilitated later developments in the civil law.  
 Both the establishment of the substance-procedure divide and the rise 
of the subjective right not only coincide, but are also intertwined. It is in-
teresting to note that one strain of the critique launched against Villey’s 
claims about Ockham points towards the separation of substance and pro-
cedure as a factor in the ascendency of the subjective right: in writings as 
early as those of the Legists, the understanding of actio was starting to 
change.86 Indeed, by the twelfth century, procedure had come to be seen 
as an autonomous discipline, drawing simultaneously from the sources of 
Roman and Canon law.87 At this stage, however, there was still little im-
petus for a theoretical explanation of how both fields related to each other. 
It was in the sixteenth century that humanist Hugo Donellus defined the 
civilian substance-procedure dichotomy. Donellus took Justinian’s defini-
tion of actio in Institutes 4.6.1 principium88 as his starting point, which 
Justinian took, in turn, from Celsus’s classical statement with which we 
are already familiar; drawing on this tradition, Donellus described the 
conceptual separation of a substantive ius, or right, and procedure as a 
means to pursue this right.89 At this point, civilian legal science had, for 
the first time, established right and action as two separate entities.90   
 It is not a coincidence that both the ascendency of the subjective right 
and the growing rift between substance and procedure culminate in the 
heyday of individualism and find their most radical formulation in nine-
teenth-century German Pandectist scholarship, which influenced legal 
      
the difference that ours are decided cases and theirs are discussed cases, more open to 
dispute” at 9-10). 
86   See Helmut Coing, “Zur Geschichte des Begriffs ‘subjektives Recht’” in Helmut Coing, 
Frederick H Lawson & Kurt Grönfors, eds, Das subjektive Recht und der Rechtsschutz 
der Persönlichkeit (Frankfurt: Alfred Metzner, 1959) at 7ff.  
87   See e.g. Stein, “Roman Law”, supra note 71 at 57-59; Van Caenegem, supra note 70 at 
48ff. On the romano-canonical procedure “in action”, see James A Brundage, The Me-
dieval Origins of the Legal Profession, Canonists, Civilians, and Courts (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2008) at 126ff. 
88   "Actio autem nihil aliud est, quam ius persequendi iudicio quod sibi debetur."  
89   Peter Stein, “Donellus and the Origins of the Modern Civil Law” in JA Ankum et al, 
eds, Mélanges Felix Wubbe: offerts par ses collègues et ses amis à l’occasion de soixante-
dixième anniversaire (Fribourg: University Press Fribourg, 1993) 439 at 446ff. 
90   Zöllner, supra note 48 at 472.  
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thought in all Continental jurisdictions, including France.91 Individualist 
philosophy and “will theory”, its legalistic expression, put the power of the 
individual in the very centre of nineteenth-century private law ideology, 
and figure prominently in the key works of scholars such as Savigny, 
Puchta, and Windscheid.92 Private law demarcates spheres of individual 
freedom; it assigns, as Savigny put it in 1840, “the individual will a realm 
where it can reign unperturbed by any other will [translated by author].”93 
This sphere of individual freedom is synonymous with the subjective 
right: it is, again in Savigny’s words, “the power of the individual person, 
a realm where his will reigns supreme [translated by author].”94  
 In the same period, Windscheid pushed the theoretical separation of 
substance and procedure to its doctrinal peak: in his famous and influen-
tial book Die Actio des römischen Civilrechts, vom Standpunkte des heuti-
gen Rechts, Windscheid expounds the actional structure of Roman law 
and contrasts it with the modern perspective of the severance of sub-
stance and procedure. At the same time, he emphasizes the paramount 
importance of the concept of the subjective right, repeating almost verba-
tim Savigny’s definition. From the perspective of nineteenth-century ius 
commune, Windscheid writes:  
the Right is the Prius, the action the subsequent, the Right is what 
creates, the action what is created. The Right assigns each individ-
ual the sphere in which his will posits law [Gesetz] for all other indi-
viduals; if the individual is not respected in this sphere, he may 
complain to the state, the guardian of Right [or law, or both; Recht 
also means “law” in the objective sense], and the state will help to 
obtain what is his. The legal order [Rechtsordnung] is an order of 
Rights [Ordnung der Rechte][translated by author].95  
                                                  
91   See e.g. Franz Wieacker, A History of Private Law in Europe: With Particular Reference 
to Germany, translated by Tony Weir (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) at 350. 
92   For “will theory” as an expression of nineteenth-century legal consciousness, see Dun-
can Kennedy, “Two Globalizations of Law & Legal Thought: 1850-1968” (2003) 36:3 Suf-
folk UL Rev 631 at 637. Whether this legal consciousness is rooted in Kantian or Hege-
lian philosophy is still a matter of contention: see generally Helge Dedek, Negative 
Haftung aus Vertrag (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007) at 101. See also James Gordley, 
The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) 
at 227. 
93   Friedrich Carl von Savigny, System des heutigen römischen Rechts (Berlin: Veit und 
Comp, 1840) vol 1 at para 52 (“dass dem individuellen Willen ein Gebiet angewiesen ist, 
in welchem er unabhängig von jedem fremden Willen zu herrschen hat”). 
94   Ibid at para 59 (“die der einzelnen Person zustehenden Macht, ein Gebiet, worin ihr 
Wille herrscht”). 
95   Windscheid, supra note 74 at 3:  
Für das heutige Rechtsbewußtsein ist das Recht das Prius, die Klage das 
Spätere, das Recht das Erzeugende, die Klage das Erzeugte. Das Recht weist 
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Displaying elaborate Romanist technique, Windscheid “proves” that the 
judicial decision does not extinguish, replace, or even novate the initial 
substantive claim: here he devises, to put it simply, a theory of rubber 
stamping.96 He particularly rejects the older theory that, as suggested by 
Savigny, actio itself is a right to “protection by the courts”, namely the 
subjective right of an individual against another that, through the viola-
tion of this right, is transformed into a right to bring an action.97 After 
Windscheid, the remaining overlap or intersection of substance and pro-
cedure was erased. Soon after, Oskar Bülow consummated the develop-
ment of strict separation of substance and procedure by characterizing the 
relationship between the citizen and the court as a particular procedural 
relationship (Prozeßrechtsverhältnis), distinct from the subjective sub-
stantive right and exclusively a matter of public law.98  
 In France, codification had cemented the external separation of the 
subject matters of substantive private law (Code civil, 1804) and civil pro-
cedure (Code de procédure, 1806). The Code de procédure, the “younger 
sister” of the Code Napoléon and not quite as innovative, exerted major 
influence in Europe.99 Yet, internally, subjective right and action, as the 
right’s procedural implementation, were still seen as unified. The position 
put forward by Demolombe is paradigmatic: starting from Celsus’s fa-
mous definition (in its version propounded in the Institutes), he postulates 
that the actional “ius persequendi in iudicio quod nobis debetur” is identi-
cal to the substantive right to “quod nobis debetur”. Here he falls back be-
hind Donellus’s interpretation of the action as a procedural vehicle for the 
      
jedem Individuum den Herrschaftskreis zu, in welchem sein Wille Gesetz für 
die anderen Individuen ist; wird das Individuum in diesem Herrschaftskreise 
nicht anerkannt, so darf es sich darüber bei dem Staate, dem Wächter des 
Rechtes, beschweren, beklagen, und der Staat hilft ihm zu dem Seinigen. Die 
Rechtsordnung ist die Ordnung der Rechte.  
96   Ibid at 112ff. 
97  Savigny, supra note 93 at paras 204-205; Windscheid, supra note 74 at 1; Savigny 
speaks of “metamorphosis” (supra note 93 at para 204 [translated by author]). The use 
of the biological term gives an insight into the conceptualization of the subjective right 
as an entity that actually leads a life. 
98   Oskar Bülow, Die Lehre von den Proceßeinreden und die Proceßvoraussetzungen 
(Gießen: Roth, 1868) at 2: “[S]o gehört dieses Verhältniß selbstverständlicher Weise dem 
öffentlichen Recht an: der Proceß ist ein öffentlichrechtliches Verhältniß.” (“This rela-
tionship, as a matter of course, falls in the category of public law: procedure is a public 
law relationship” [translated by author]). See also Horst Konzen, Rechtsverhältnisse 
zwischen Prozeßparteien (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1974) at 105.  
99   CH van Rhee, “Introduction” in CH van Rhee, ed, European Traditions in Civil Proce-
dure (Oxford: Intersentia, 2005) at 6. The CPC of 1806 incorporated major parts of the 
Royal Ordinance on Civil Procedure of 1667.  
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implementation of the substantive right. Very close to Savigny’s formula 
of the action being “the right in a state of defense”, Demolombe writes:  
L’action enfin, c’est le droit lui-même mis en mouvement; c’est le 
droit à l’état d’action, au lieu d’être à l’état de repos; le droit à l’état 
de guerre, au lieu d’être à l’état de paix.100  
The strict separation of right and action had its breakthrough only in the 
twentieth century, championed by the works of Vizioz and Motulsky, who 
also adopted the language of labelling procedure as the servant of the 
substantive law.101 
 This master-servant imagery does not only have doctrinal implica-
tions; it speaks, on a more foundational level, to the supremacy of private 
law over public law, which is another hallmark of civilian thinking.102 Pro-
cedure is an institution of public law that merely implements the preced-
ing subjective private law rights. Legal philosopher Hans Kelsen pointed 
out how nineteenth-century legal thought understood this precedence of 
the subjective right over the procedural framework of its realization to be 
logical as well as temporal; the subjective rights of private individuals 
were thus endowed with metaphysical, ontological significance, above and 
beyond the positive law. While the objective—public—law(s), forms of 
government, and procedures of enforcement are ever changing, the sub-
jective rights of the individual are pre-positive, almost natural, and there-
fore the very centre of the liberal, private law–based legal philosophy of 
the nineteenth century.103  
 It is important to be aware of the necessary simplification of discuss-
ing “the” civil law and its development, of the very broad brush strokes 
with which we depicted a tradition of two thousand years with its mani-
fold local variations and permutations. In a legal culture of scholarly dis-
pute, there are of course deviating opinions on this topic; they pertain to 
the precedence of rights over actions as well as the pre-eminence of the 
subjective right. For example, in 1927, German legal philosopher Julius 
Binder, from the angle of an extreme (and ideologically instrumental) 
consequentialism, took a remedies-before-rights approach and attempted 
to turn Windscheid’s famous formulation on its head, postulating that it is 
                                                  
100  C Demolombe, Cours de code civil (Bruxelles: Meline, Cans et Compagnie, 1854) t 5 at 
para 338. 
101  See Cadiet & Jeuland, supra note 49 at para 317; Motulsky, supra note 51. 
102  Which, again, is not to say that the common law is not familiar with the image of the 
servant: ibid at 101.  
103  See Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre: Einleitung in die Rechtswissenschaftliche Prob-
lematik (Tübingen: JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1934) at 40-44 [Kelsen, Reine Rechtsleh-
re]. 
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the action that is the prius, whereas the right is the posterius.104 Kelsen, a 
scholar of completely different ideological denomination than Binder, 
launched his well known attack against the subjective right in his Pure 
Theory of Law, first published in 1934. In Kelsen’s extreme formulation of 
positivism, there is no room for a pre-positive subjective entitlement. 
Rights are merely a reflex of the objective order; they are the possibility 
the state offers to individuals to apply for a remedy that protects, first and 
foremost, the objective legal order.105 Be this as it may, however influen-
tial Kelsen’s ideas otherwise were, his theory of the subjective right never 
held much sway among civilian private lawyers and never entered the 
mainstream. The concept of subjective law was and is too ingrained in 
Continental private law thinking; it is not a coincidence that Kelsen was, 
by training, a scholar of public law.106   
3. The Role of the Judge 
 Furthermore, the theoretical precedence of rights over actions ties in 
with the civilian paradigm of the judge “finding” law rather than “mak-
ing” it. This paradigm provides that in order to find the law, norms, 
which, in a private law context, are mostly derived from codal provisions, 
are applied to the facts at hand. The norms are applied in what amounts 
to a syllogistical operation; they, not the judge, decide the case.107 The 
process of “application” by the judge ex post only reveals what has been 
the “true” substantive relationship between the parties from the outset.  
 This, again, is an axiom rather than an actual belief held by judges 
and other legal actors. Its intellectual origins were partly a strict under-
standing of the separation of powers, which included the revolutionary 
thrust to limit the arbitrary power of the judiciary, and partly the fascina-
                                                  
104  On Binder’s politics, see Bernd Rüthers, Geschönte Geschichten, Geschonte Biographien: 
Sozialisationskohorten in Wendeliteraturen, Ein Essay (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001) 
at 80ff. Binder’s pragmatism was supposed to refute the theory of adjudication that as-
sumed the judge was strictly bound by positive rules. In postulating that the judge was 
actually making the law, Binder in fact justified, in theoretical terms, an unrestricted 
reformulation of the law without democratic legitimation, according to the ascending 
National Socialist ideology. On the intellectual link between German scholars who sup-
ported National Socialist ideology and American pragmatism, see Hans Joas, Pragma-
tism and Social Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993) at 107; Posner, su-
pra note 35 at 45; Julius Binder, Prozess und Recht: ein Beitrag zur Lehre vom Rechtss-
chutzanspruch (Leipzig: Deichert, 1927). 
105  Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, supra note 103 at 49-52. 
106  Kelsen’s habilitation thesis (1911) focused on “Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre”: 
Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (Tübingen: JCB Mohr (Paul Sie-
beck), 1923). 
107  Merryman & Pérez-Perdomo, supra note 70 at 36. 
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tion with the code as a rational and scientific system that could pre-
determine judicial decision making.108 We know of the early ill-conceived 
attempts in France and Prussia to even go so far as to outlaw judicial in-
terpretation and to oblige judges to submit questions of interpretation to 
the legislature.109 When the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) 
came into force roughly a century after the French Code civil, the expecta-
tions as to how much work the codification could do for the judge had al-
ready been lowered considerably.110 However, even nowadays, the para-
digm persists that the judge applies law and does not make it. The style of 
how French judges still draft their judgments bears witness to how this 
paradigm is upheld: the brevity and peremptory phrasing follows the aes-
thetics of the judge as the mere “mouth”111 of the code. And even though 
judges themselves might not truly believe in this stylized view of adjudi-
cation, the practice is upheld to keep up this very appearance.112 There-
fore, it is unsurprising that the methodological mainstream (leading trea-
tises, etc.,) still maintain that judge-made law is indeed not law at all: 
case law, jurisprudence, even if it is constante (ständige Rechtsprechung) 
is accepted as an authority in the sense that as a matter of fact, lower 
courts are likely to adhere to the path chosen by higher courts, and practi-
tioners, to phrase their arguments accordingly.113 It is not, however, a 
“source of law”, since it is only an interpretation of the positive norms.114 
                                                  
108  For an account of the revolutionary attempts to limit the power of the judiciary, see e.g. 
John P Dawson, The Oracles of the Law (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Law 
School, 1968) at 375ff; Barry Nicholas, The French Law of Contract, 2d ed (Oxford: 
Clarendon PressOxford University Press, 1992) at 10. For the roots of the code as a na-
tional and scientific system, see Berkowitz, supra note 72.  
109  Dawson, supra note 108 at 376. Merryman & Pérez-Perdomo, supra note 70 at 39. 
110  “Motive zu dem Entwurfe eines Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches für das Deutsche Reich 1” 
(1888) 14-17, translated by and reprinted in James Gordley & Arthur Taylor von Me-
hren, An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Private Law: Readings, Cases, Mate-
rials (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 61. 
111  Charles de Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois (London: no publisher, 1768) at 327. Daw-
son, supra note 108 at 407ff. 
112  C.f. Mitchel de S-O-l’E Lasser, “Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the 
French Legal System” (1994) 104:6 Yale LJ 1325 at 1334, 1343ff (contrast of the “offi-
cial,” and the “unofficial” French portrait of the civil judge). 
113  It is very telling that probably the most widely-used and most frequently cited German 
treatise on legal methodology uses the term “judge-made law” (Richterrecht) only in 
quotation marks to emphasize that it is not a source of law: Karl Larenz & Claus-
Wilhelm Canaris, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, 3d ed (Berlin: Springer, 1995) 
at 252-53, 255, 258. 
114  Ibid at 252-61; Dawson, supra note 108 at 400ff; Nicholas, supra note 108 at 12-19; 
Jean Carbonnier, Droit civil, t 1 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004) (“[l]a 
jurisprudence apparaît ainsi comme une habitude des tribunaux”at para 31). See also 
The Honourable Madame Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, Justice of the Supreme Court 
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 Besides the fact that this conceptualization of the role of the judge 
links back to our earlier point that the judge in the civil law is simply not 
as important a figure as in the common law tradition, it is easy to see how 
this fact is, on a theoretical level, connected to the idea of sanctioning pre-
existing rights rather than creating rights through granting a remedy.115 
If the judge, rather than making law, “finds” the law (in an objective 
sense), she also “finds” the parties’ subjective rights.  
IV. Some Comparative Remarks  
A. “Finding” Law and “Making” Rights: Equity, Good Faith, and Discretion-
ary Awards  
 Although it is not widely reflected upon at a conscious level, this 
model of the rights-action dichotomy might be too much part of civilian 
private law folklore to be uprooted by a sidewind of lofty scholarship, such 
as Kelsen’s fundamental attack launched from the position of a public law 
scholar.116 However on a less foundational level, the civilian model has an 
obvious open flank. Even if one believes in the precedence of rights over 
actions (or “remedies” if you will), one has to wonder about the practicabil-
ity of the strict conceptual separation. Private law rights are not ends in 
themselves; of what use, after all, are rights without remedies, substan-
tive entitlements without any means of realization, if people do not com-
ply with them? Does it not make sense to keep an eye on the possible en-
forcement of a right while discussing its substantive merits?  
 On a theoretical level, it is, of course, easier for a codified system to 
create rights without a remedy—rights that cannot be enforced in court. A 
code or statute can simply posit that a right exists, even if no remedy is 
being offered in case of its violation (lex imperfecta).117 From a strictly 
positivist perspective, the possibility of enforcement is not a requirement 
to acknowledge a norm as granting a legal right; it is sufficient that the 
sovereign so commands. Conversely, in a system that is strictly based on 
      
of Canada, “By Reason of Authority or by Authority of Reason” (1993) 27:1 UBCL Rev 1 
at 9ff. 
115  See Part II.2(a), above. 
116  See Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, supra note 103. 
117  Guinchard, Ferrand & Chainais name the concept “obligation naturelle” as an example 
of a right without a corresponding action; however, the natural obligation is an obliga-
tion that cannot be enforced because there is no substantive right to demand perform-
ance—which is why the obligation is just “natural” and not “legal” (supra note 48 at 
para 87; art 1554 CCQ; art 656 BGB). Again, the Roman position was different insofar 
as the procedural and the substantive were not separated, but see Zimmermann, supra 
note 73 at 7ff.  
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precedent, musings about rights that do not lead to remedial relief would 
per se only be obiter dicta and would not, in a technical sense, create law.   
 However, even if there are no theoretical objections against creating 
rights without remedies—even if civilians are said to be less “pragmatic” 
than the common lawyer—it is not because civilians have been completely 
impervious to arguments of practicality. We recall Jhering’s statement 
that a right that cannot be realized is nothing but words, nothing but a 
legal phantom.118 If we want to understand how a right actually operates 
and fulfills its purpose, it is inevitable that we assume a more holistic, or, 
as we called it earlier, a more “monist” perspective, a perspective that in-
cludes procedural implementation and enforcement. What is first disen-
tangled and divided by a theory of strict separation between substance 
and procedure has to be reunited in order to comprehend the legal proc-
ess; civilian authors have therefore criticized the dichotomy of substance 
and procedure as impractical and artificial.119  
 The postulate of the primacy of substantive law over procedural laws, 
which entails that substantive rights somehow exist before the judge can 
find them and see to their proper enforcement, obviously marginalizes 
what judges actually do and is counterintuitive to any insight of even an 
undogmatic legal realism. The artificiality of the theoretical assumption 
becomes particularly conspicuous in cases where the judicial decision in-
volves an obvious degree of latitude.  
 In the common law, working from the paradigm of a strong, law-
creating judge, it seems clear that there are situations in which the avail-
ability of a remedy—of a court order—is partly or even entirely within the 
discretion of the court. Equitable remedies are the most obvious example. 
Historically, one of the reasons for the English law’s preference for reme-
dies over rights has been the role of equity.120 Even in modern, rights-
based common law scholarship, we still find reverberations of the peculiar 
distinction between law and equity: if the availability of a court order is in 
the court’s discretion, argues Stephen Smith, there can be no substantive 
right against the court to obtain such an order; for example, to the specific 
performance of a contract. If the court exercises its discretion by granting 
                                                  
118  R von Jhering, L’esprit du droit romain dans les diverses phases de son développement, t 
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the order, it just so happens that it replicates an initial right to have the 
contract performed.121 Peter Birks held similar views regarding court or-
ders that are “strongly discretionary”: “the discretion which is interposed 
between the plaintiff and the order shows that he has no right to that 
which he wants ordered.”122  
 Birks’s approach to the rights-remedies relationship seems, however, 
more civilian—an inclination that expresses itself in a tendency to per-
ceive what a court does as mostly confirming pre-existing rights. In order 
to be able to categorize the maximum number of cases as cases where the 
court thus confirms the plaintiff’s rights, Birks distinguishes between 
strong and weak discretion. “Orders for specific performance and for in-
junctions and all others rooted in the Court of Chancery are”, according to 
Birks, “weakly discretionary”: because “[t]he discretion has been settled 
over centuries”,123 it can be determined whether a person has a right to an 
equitable remedy.  
 Again, the civilian approach is even more extreme. When it comes to 
the adjudication of substantive rights, there is no such thing as discretion. 
Institutionally, the civil law has simply not retained any equivalent to the 
equitable jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery. Of course, comparatists 
would bring up the concept of good faith (bona fides, bonne foi, Treu und 
Glauben) as a functional equivalent; and to be sure, on a substantive level, 
both equity and good faith serve to temper and correct respectively the 
harsh results of the strict common and civil laws.124 Again, if we focus on 
the historical roots, we might detect certain commonalities between the 
Chancelor’s correction of the common law and the praetor’s exceptions to 
the older ius civile.125 However, according to the civilian purist conceptu-
alization of the separation of powers, all judicial decisions as to the sub-
stantive law have to be made as a matter of right; there is no room for 
discretion in the sense of a residue of a judicial prerogative to arbitrari-
ness. Thus, in procedural terms, good faith is not connected to a notion of 
judicial discretion equal to the discretionary power that is associated with 
equity in English law. The idea that the judge finds law—that is, reveals 
the rights existing between the parties—implies that there can be no legal 
vacuum to be filled by judicial discretion. This belief in norms and rights 
                                                  
121  Smith, “Damages”, supra note 31 at 44ff.  
122  Birks, “Rights, Wrongs”, supra note 29 at 16. 
123  Ibid. 
124  Martin Josef Schermaier, “Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law” in Reinhard 
Zimmermann & Simon Whittaker, eds, Good Faith in European Contract Law (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 63. 
125  Ibid at 65. 
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as the foundation of all justice, this extreme legalistic view, is anathema 
to the idea of equity as a judicial freedom, equity as famously character-
ized by Roscoe Pound as “justice without law”.126  
 Of course, in a decision that involves recourse to the principle of good 
faith as a corrective of what seems to be an unfair outcome, the judge has, 
as a matter of fact, a great degree of latitude. However, it is important to 
understand that as a matter of law, the civilian paradigm still demands 
that the judge merely find a duty of, or exceptio grounded in, good faith, 
and that the party benefitting from such emanations of good faith does so 
as a matter of right. Despite the fact that in matters involving good faith, 
decisions may vary widely depending on the particular judge’s personal or 
political convictions, German civil law scholarship insists, even nowadays, 
that in theory there can only be one right decision: this is the decision 
preordained by substantive law, which has to be found properly by the sit-
ting judge.127  
 The same theoretical axiom is applied in another context, which fig-
ures prominently in the works of Stephen Smith—namely, the award of 
damages. Smith is particularly interested in oddities such as nominal and 
punitive damages, and damages for non-pecuniary loss. Smith writes 
that, in such cases, it is the court that creates a right to the awarded 
damages. The law that governs the award of damages gives rise to a right 
on the part of the plaintiff; such a right, however, is directed against the 
court rather than against the defendant.128 In other words, at the time of 
the occurrence of the event that gives rise to a right to compensation—a 
tort is committed, a contract breached—a right to a certain award of dam-
ages cannot yet come into existence since it has to be determined by the 
court after the fact and it is almost unpredictable beforehand, even for le-
gal experts specializing in the field.129 For the civilian, this is once more 
merely a factual complication. The fact that it is almost impossible to ac-
curately predict the sum eventually granted by the court has no impact on 
the theoretical assumption that the right to the sum eventually awarded 
came into existence in the very same moment the (secondary) right to 
compensation was born—the moment the tort was committed or the con-
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128  Smith, “Damages”, supra note 31 at 55-60. 
129  Ibid at 59:  
This conclusion is consistent with another feature of pain and suffering 
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amount that a court will order by way of a pain and suffering award unless 
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tract was breached. Since this right existed from the very occurrence of 
such a causative event, there is also no true discretionary element in-
volved in the judicial decision; again, possibly diverging assessments by 
different individual judges or different instances are merely factual devia-
tions.130 Since the right came into existence as a right between obligor and 
obligee, the right is a right against another citizen and not a right against 
the court. Of course, even civilian procedural scholarship assumes that 
when an action is brought, the plaintiff has some sort of a subjective right 
against the court. However, it is not a substantive right to damages as as-
sumed by Smith, but a procedural right to be heard, to be granted fair 
treatment, and to receive the proper application of legal rules.131 Civil law 
scholarship has given up on the idea of an actional right against the court 
that somehow mirrors the subjective substantive right of the plaintiff 
since the days of Demolombe and Savigny. Smith is surprisingly close to 
Savigny’s position—which is, by all means, a compliment, even for a 
common lawyer.132 
 To the legal realist, of course, the idea of “finding the law”—
particularly in cases in which the human factor in adjudication is obvi-
ous—might seem far-fetched, even ludicrous. Finding the “right answer” 
in hard cases might be practically superhuman, but we might remind our-
selves that it is an assumption well known even among common lawyers 
that this task is not unthinkable on a theoretical level.133 In regard to our 
initial question, we can conclude that the law of damages, in the civil law, 
defines a right to damages as a sanction of a violation of a primary right, 
which is eventually confirmed by the court in a court order. Damages are 
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not a remedy in the sense that the court order itself is in any way a causa-
tive event that reshapes the plaintiff’s initial right to damages or even 
originally generates it; neither, therefore, is the plaintiff’s right directed 
against the court.134  
B. Specific Performance 
 Perhaps the most prominent example of how “remedial imaginations” 
diverge is the conceptualization of the specific performance of a contract. 
Given the abundance of literature on the topic, I can limit myself to a few 
comparative remarks that, again, will remind us that what we are used to 
thinking of as “the” position of a legal system regarding any doctrinal 
question is simply a snapshot of a certain state of development at a cer-
tain moment in time.  
 Specific performance is an instance of diverging reactions to the 
breach or non-performance (or mal-performance) of a contract. In the 
common law,135 a decree for specific performance is thought of as an equi-
table remedy; it is a judicial order whose availability is (at least to a cer-
tain degree) within the court’s discretion and that presupposes that no 
adequate remedy exists at law (i.e., damages are not sufficient to properly 
compensate for the loss suffered).136 In the civil law, however, specific per-
formance is said to be the primary, the most readily available remedy.137 
The civil law seeks to enforce the contractual promise, since it focuses on 
the moral duty to keep a promise;138 whereas the more business-minded, 
pragmatic common law, as goes the standard explanation, typically sees a 
contract as a market transaction that the parties enter into for their fi-
nancial benefit, and as such, perceives monetary damages to be the most 
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adequate way to compensate for breach.139 Indeed, it is not easy to explain 
the secondary role of specific performance in common law from the per-
spective of a rights-based approach that acknowledges the duty to keep 
one’s word as the primary obligation arising from a contract.140  
 Much has been written about whether there is a tendency of conver-
gence between the common law and the civil law in their preferred reme-
dies, or whether the theoretical preference for specific performance in the 
civil law actually translates into a preference that is measurable in em-
pirical terms.141 For us, however, it is more interesting to take a closer 
look at the underlying doctrinal construction, for it is quite telling in re-
spect to how civilians and common lawyers think differently about the re-
lationship between rights and remedies. In the civil law, a court order for 
specific performance does not create a new right or replicate an old one. 
The court merely confirms what is thought of as the first and foremost 
right flowing from a contract: the right to receive what has been promised. 
Thus, it is the primary right itself that is being realized, and not a secon-
dary right, which is caused by a wrong. Enforcing a contract, to a civilian, 
means the confirmation of the primary right to performance, which is 
identified with the contract itself. It is important to note that this model 
strictly separates the perspective of substantive law and the perspective 
of procedure and execution. The fact that, in many instances, contractual 
duties cannot be enforced due to their particular content does not dimin-
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ish the almost logical appeal of the primary right to performance being 
the theoretical starting point of the enforcement of a contract. Yves-Marie 
Laithier describes the position of the mainstream as follows: 
Cessant d’être un moyen, l’exécution forcée en nature est devenue 
une fin. Faisant appel à ... l’article 1142 du Code civil, on prétend 
qu’il est de l’essence de l’obligation contractuelle d’être exécutée en 
nature, que c’est la seule sanction capable de « réaliser » tant le droit 
subjectif du créancier que le droit objectif ... [S]e libérer en versant 
des dommages-intérêts en lieu et place de la prestation promise, c’est 
l’autoriser à modifier unilatéralement l’objet de l’obligation.142 
This reminds us to be cautious when addressing specific performance in 
the civil law as “remedy”. Although it is surely possible to use the term in 
a very broad and non-technical (a comparatist might say functional) way, 
we must keep in mind that the term does not have the same implications 
for the civilian and the common lawyer. When we call civil law specific 
performance a remedy, we should be aware that in the civil law it is not a 
response to a wrong, that it is not a “cure”. We should be aware that for 
the civilian, specific performance refers to the content of a substantive 
primary right, not to the content of a court order. We should be aware 
that a court order confirming this primary right is, first of all, simply a 
statement that the plaintiff holds this right; it does not automatically en-
tail an injunction.143 In light of these differences, we might wonder 
whether calling civilian specific performance a remedy does more harm 
than good.  
 On a different note, however, the peculiar history of specific perform-
ance reminds us of how substance and procedure, rights and remedies can 
be separated conceptually, but are genealogically connected and inter-
woven. The supremacy of the right to performance in the civil law is a 
relatively recent development; classical Roman law of procedure knew 
nothing of specific performance, and therefore, one can assume that the 
primary obligation to perform a contract did not have the same content or 
importance ascribed to it today.144 The medieval concept nemo praecise 
cogi ad factum limited the actual availability of the specific enforcement 
of obligations; however, it exerted influence on the theory of obligations 
and rights as well, as is reflected in the idea that an obligation to do or not 
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to do “resolves itself” into an obligation to pay damages.145 This is also ap-
parent in the Pandectist notion that the content of every obligation is a 
duty to perform in kind and, eventually, to pay an equivalent in dam-
ages.146 In France, it was only the judicial creation of the astreinte, devel-
oped in the early nineteenth century, that established specific perform-
ance as a primary remedy.147 Only the interplay of many factors—from 
the rise of the subjective right and will theory as the reigning paradigm of 
private law to the internal separation of procedure and substance and the 
development of actual procedural means of enforcement—has brought 
about the current theoretical supremacy of the right to specific perform-
ance. In the life of the law, substance and procedure, right and remedy 
have shaped each other reciprocally. To ask which one precedes, in a his-
torical sense, is indeed, as Zakrzewski put it, to ask which came first: the 
chicken or the egg.148  
 The positions of the civil law and the common law traditions are de-
fined by their historically determined conceptualization of the relation-
ship between substance and procedure, right and remedy, and right and 
action. It is this insight that makes us realize that the pure civilian posi-
tion can hardly be upheld in an environment where the substantive law is 
civilian, but the law of procedure is of common law origin; where judges 
have to interpret a code, but have the importance and self-image of com-
mon law judges.149 Our inquiry has briefly outlined the terminological as 
well as the theoretical disparities between the common law and civil law 
traditions. This helps us understand the tension that is inevitable when 
both traditions clash, as is the case in Quebec.150 The unavoidable tension 
is palpable in recent cases such as Construction Belcourt Ltée v. Golden 
Griddle Pancake House Ltd.,151 where the court struggled with the pri-
macy-of-rights approach of the civil law and the connotations evoked by 
the term injunction, to which the court kept referring as an “equitable 
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remedy”.152 In this context Pierre Bienvenu has aptly summed up in one 
simple catchphrase the epistemological difference between a common law 
remedy and a procedural means to realize a subjective right in the civilian 
sense: “L’injonction mandatoire: véritable remedy ou simple procédure.”153 
In recent years, judges in Quebec have been increasingly willing to inter-
pret and develop Quebec civil law within the larger context of the civilian 
tradition, as shown by the evolving case law on good faith. It seems to be 
in line with this development that, in its approach to specific performance, 
Quebec law has managed to assign to the “injunction” the function of ser-
vant of the substantive right to performance—or, in the words of Bien-
venu, as simple procédure—and not that of an equitable remedy in the 
common law sense.154  
Conclusion 
 Let us return to the question before us and to our initial tentative an-
swer: Has our inquiry added more evidence in favour of our hypothesis 
that remedies precede rights in the common law, and that rights precede 
remedies in the civil law? The short answer to the short question might be 
“yes”, but only if we accept that the notions of “remedy” and “(subjective) 
right” do not, traditionally, have the same meaning for common lawyers 
and civilians. In other words, if we accept that, in the civil law, rights do 
not precede remedies in an ontological or historical way, but that the idea 
of such precedence is itself the result of a complex historical and contin-
gent process.  
 The lesson to be learned, once more, is to take legal language, to take 
differences between legal terminologies seriously. Indeed, as Denis Tallon 
remarked, such differences are always indicative of larger and more deep-
seated divergences.155 The lack of “remedy” in the vocabulary of the civil 
law is more than just a matter of different labelling; it is the expression of 
a different way of thinking about law. As we observed at the beginning of 
our inquiry, translating the ideal into the real is a complex task, common 
to every legal system, that binds its adjudicative bodies through prefor-
mulated norms. Only if a legal system is capable of satisfactorily trans-
                                                  
152  Art 751 CCP. 
153  Pierre Bienvenu, “Pour l’injonction mandatoire comme recours d’exécution en nature: 
Quelques réflections d’un practicien” (1989) 20:1 RGD 65 at 72 [emphasis in original]. 
154  See e.g. Aubrais c Laval (Ville de), [1996] RJQ 2239 (CS) (available on QL); Varnet UK 
Ltd c Varnet Software Corp, [1994] RJQ 2755, 59 CPR (3d) 29 (CA); Gosselin c Rock 
Forest (Ville de), [1991] RJQ 1000 (CA) (available on QL); Bienvenu, supra note 153; 
Rosalie Jukier, “The Emergence of Specific Performance as a Major Remedy in Quebec 
Law” (1987) 47:1 R du B 47. 
155  Tallon, “Remedies”, supra note 8 at 263ff. 
114   (2010) 56:1   MCGILL LAW JOURNAL ~ REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  
 
 
posing the abstract discourse of the law into social reality is justice car-
ried out; only then does the legal machinery fulfill its purpose. Due to the 
(literally) pivotal importance of this translational process, the way it is 
cast into legal concepts allows for an insight into the remaining epistemo-
logical differences between the legal traditions of the West. In a mixed ju-
risdiction, where those traditions meet, mingle, and clash, the under-
standing of these differences is not just a matter of academic interest. A 
thorough exploration of what is “in the mix” is necessary to understand 
the condition of a mixed jurisdiction, and to define its future course.  
    
